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PRESERVING THE
SECURED CREDITOR’S BARGAIN IN
CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWN SCENARIOS
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits Congress to
enact federal laws that preempt citizens’ state law rights in bankruptcy
proceedings. 1 When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy
Code modifies the state law contract rights of his or her creditors. 2
Although some modifications, such as the automatic stay, may only be
temporary, 3 others permanently inhibit the creditor’s ability to invoke state
law collection rights against the debtor.4 One of the central policy debates
in bankruptcy scholarship addresses how much—and to what end—the
Bankruptcy Code should modify the contract rights of creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings. 5
Creditors whose loans are secured by collateral (secured creditors)
receive a greater level of protection from the Bankruptcy Code than do
general unsecured creditors. 6 However, the Bankruptcy Code does not
guarantee that the contract rights of secured creditors will be preserved
entirely. One important modification of the rights of secured creditors that
is permitted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 7 is embodied in the
“cramdown” provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A). This provision
permits a bankruptcy court to approve a plan of reorganization even over
the objection of secured creditors. 8 The three clauses of 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A) set out the limited circumstances under which a bankruptcy
court may approve a plan of reorganization that modifies the rights of
secured creditors without their consent. 9 Thus, it outlines three ways in

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz’ New Bankruptcy
Exceptions to State Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 95, 119 (2007).
2. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
3. See, e.g., id. § 362(d) (setting out circumstances under which a bankruptcy court will grant
relief from the automatic stay).
4. See, e.g., id. § 727 (providing for discharge of debt).
5. See, e.g., Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822–25 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditor’s Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1982); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781 (1987) (“Although this distinction between
substantive rights and collection rules might seem obvious, it is important to the policy debate,
which often centers on the degree to which bankruptcy law should ‘rely’ on underlying state
law.”).
6. ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 156 (2008).
7. Chapter 11 is the portion of the Bankruptcy Code that provides for the alteration of
businesses’ debt obligations under the federal bankruptcy laws. Id. at 4.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
9. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
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which the Bankruptcy Code permits the permanent modification of secured
creditors’ contract rights in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Several recent cases have addressed this provision and the degree of
protection that it affords to secured creditors. 10 In RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, a Supreme Court decision resolving a circuit
split between the Seventh Circuit and the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Court
affirmed the right of secured creditors to credit bid 11 at auctions of their
collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).12 A separate Seventh Circuit
decision, In re River East Plaza, LLC, struck down a plan that both
stretched out the repayment period and replaced the creditor’s collateral
with substitute collateral. 13 Ultimately, both courts interpreted the statute in
a way that gave robust protection to the contract rights of secured creditors.
Such protection is consistent with an approach to bankruptcy policy
known as the “creditor’s-bargain” approach. Proponents of this approach
argue that the purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to solve the collective
action problem that arises when debtors with multiple creditors default on
their loans.14 Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a means of ensuring that the debtor’s
assets will be used in a way that maximizes returns to creditors.15 Thus, the
Bankruptcy Code should only facilitate a business’s survival if its goingconcern value is greater than its liquidation value. 16 Since creditors with
security interests have bargained for priority in the state law hierarchy of
repayment, 17 the Bankruptcy Code’s primary objective should be to
preserve this hierarchy to the extent possible. 18 From this perspective, the
decisions in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and River East Plaza, LLC were
correctly decided because they rejected plans that upset the state law

10. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70 (2012);
In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2012); In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651
F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010); In
re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2009).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) provides secured creditors whose collateral is sold the right to bid at
the sale of that collateral, and if they successfully purchase the collateral, they “may offset such
claim against the purchase price of such property.” This practice is known as “credit bidding.” In
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 302 n.4.
12. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
13. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 834.
14. Jackson, supra note 5, at 862.
15. Warren, supra note 5, at 798.
16. A firm’s going-concern value is its value as a functioning business, without the threat of
liquidation. MICHAEL A. GERBER & GEORGE W. KUNEY, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 94 (3d ed.
2013). A firm’s liquidation value is the total value of a company’s physical assets. Id. at 93.
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain approach argue that a business that files under Chapter 11
should only survive if its survival would increase the amounts received by creditors. Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 109 (1984).
17. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 112.
18. Id. at 129.
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hierarchy of repayment, effectively permitting payments to junior creditors
before senior creditors were paid in full.
The Third and Fifth Circuits interpreted § 1129(b)(2)(A) in a way that
is consistent with another prominent approach to bankruptcy policy, which I
will refer to as the “optimal loss distribution” approach. Proponents of this
view note that bankruptcy proceedings invariably result in losses for many
of the constituencies affected by the bankruptcy, 19 and they argue that a
principal role of bankruptcy is the optimal distribution of such losses. 20
Under this approach, the role of Chapter 11 is to address a broad range of
social problems caused by business failure. 21 Thus, bankruptcy courts
should consider not only the interests of secured and unsecured creditors,
but also the interests of the firm itself, as well as its employees, customers,
and suppliers. 22 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of § 1129(b)(2)(A) in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation in River East Plaza, LLC essentially closed off two
avenues of discretion through which bankruptcy judges could take such
considerations into account.
This Note will examine § 1129(b)(2)(A)’s function in the Bankruptcy
Code and the policy implications of recent interpretations of this provision.
Part I of this Note will explore the relevant portions of the Bankruptcy
Code. Part II will summarize the recent decisions interpreting §
1129(b)(2)(A). Part III will summarize two competing approaches to
bankruptcy policy that help to illuminate what is at stake in the courts’
interpretations of this provision. Part IV will argue that the prevailing
interpretations are sound and that in the context of § 1129(b)(2)(A),
preservation of the state law bargains made by secured creditors should be
the guiding policy consideration.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Warren, supra note 5, at 785.
Id.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 101.
Warren, supra note 5, at 787–88.
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I. SECTION 1129(b) AND THE PROTECTION OF SECURED
CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS
One of the central elements of the Chapter 11 process is the
confirmation of the firm’s plan of reorganization, 23 which typically results
in some modification of the debt obligations of the debtor business. 24 When
a business files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay immediately goes
into effect, preventing all creditors from taking any action to recover their
debts. 25 Creditors are grouped into classes based on the types of claims that
they hold against the debtor. 26 In Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor is
given a certain amount of time to propose a plan of reorganization for
approval by the bankruptcy court (the exclusivity period), 27 after which the
different classes of creditors are permitted to submit their own plans for
approval. 28
Generally, confirmation of the plan of reorganization is contingent upon
the consent of each class of creditors. 29 However, in the event that the
debtor cannot obtain the approval of each class of creditors, the Bankruptcy
Code provides the debtor with an alternative route to confirmation, which is
set out in § 1129(b). 30 Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the
bankruptcy court to approve a plan of reorganization without the consent of
every class of the creditors,31 but it also prescribes strict criteria with which
such a plan must comply. 32 According to this provision, the bankruptcy
court should only approve a plan of reorganization if the plan conforms to
every requirement of § 1129(a) besides the requirement that all creditors
consent, and as long as such a plan is “fair and equitable, with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.” 33
The Code goes on to specify the criteria for “fair and equitable”
treatment with regard to secured creditors in § 1129(b)(2)(A), which sets
forth the three types of plans that will meet this standard. 34 The first two
clauses indicate specific modifications that a bankruptcy court will permit.
Under clause (i) (Path One), a court will approve any plan in which the
secured creditors retain their liens and receive “deferred cash payments
totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim . . . as of the effective
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

WARREN, supra note 6, at 134.
Id. at 147.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
WARREN, supra note 6, at 150.
Id. at 136.
11 U.S.C. § 1121.
Id. § 1129(a)(8).
Id. § 1129(b).
Id.
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
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date of the plan.” 35 Secured creditors who retain their liens under this
provision but who are still not fully secured 36 are also permitted, under §
1111(b), to elect that their claims be treated as fully secured. 37 Under clause
(ii) (Path Two), a court will approve any plan that proposes to pay the
secured creditor the proceeds from the sale of the collateral, as long as the
secured creditor is provided the right to credit bid at the sale pursuant to §
363(k). 38 Thus, §§ 363(k) and 1111(b) are means by which secured
creditors can protect themselves when reorganization plans are “crammed
down” under Path One or Path Two without their consent. 39
Clause (iii) (Path Three) sets out a less precisely defined route to
confirmation. Under this clause, a court will approve any plan that strips a
creditor of its lien, but Path Three provides for the “realization by such
[creditor] of the indubitable equivalent” of its claims. 40 The phrase
“indubitable equivalent” is taken from Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in In
re Murel Holding Corp., where the court rejected a repayment plan that
proposed to strip the creditor of its lien and repay the balance of the secured
debt in a balloon payment ten years after confirmation of the plan. 41 Judge
Hand held that a secured creditor could not be deprived of its collateral
“unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.” 42 However,
“indubitable equivalent” remains a poorly defined standard, as the In re
Pacific Lumber Co. court observes: “What measures constitute the
indubitable equivalent of the value of the Noteholders’ collateral are rarely
explained in caselaw, because most contested reorganization plans follow
familiar paths outlined in Clauses (i) and (ii).” 43
Section 1129(b)’s protection of secured creditors in cramdown
scenarios is an application of what is known as the “absolute priority
rule.” 44 This rule requires that senior creditors be paid in full before junior
creditors are paid at all, thus creating a hierarchy of rights of repayment. 45
A reorganization plan that adhered to this rule would pay all secured
35. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
36. A secured creditor is fully secured when the value of its collateral matches or exceeds the

value of its claim. WARREN, supra note 6, at 47. A secured creditor is under-secured when its
claim exceeds the value of the collateral. Id. at 47–48. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506, such creditors’
claims are bifurcated, so that a secured creditor has a secured claim equal in amount to the value
of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the remainder.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 111(b); see also WARREN, supra note 6, at 157–59 (“The undersecured
creditor whose claim is bifurcated into its secured and unsecured portions for treatment under the
plan is permitted to waive its unsecured claims and demand instead full repayment of its total
claim (11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)).”).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“[F]or the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title . . . .”).
39. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
41. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
42. Id. at 942.
43. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009).
44. Id. at 244.
45. WARREN, supra note 6, at 156.
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creditors the full value of their collateral before paying anything to
unsecured creditors, would pay priority unsecured creditors in full before
paying general unsecured creditors anything, and would pay general
unsecured creditors in full before paying equity holders anything. 46 Path
One preserves this principle by requiring debtors to pay “at least the
allowed amount” 47 of the secured creditors’ claims, and secured creditors
are further protected by the requirement that they retain their liens on the
collateral. Path Two preserves this principle by protecting secured creditors
from the danger of undervaluation at sales of their collateral. The extent to
which Path Three preserves this principle is the issue that is addressed by
the cases discussed in this Note.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF § 1129(b)(2)(A)
The proper interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) has been the subject of
recent litigation in U.S. Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 48 All of
the cases discussed in this Note address plans of reorganization that strip
secured creditors of their collateral “in the name of indubitable
equivalence.” 49 In the circuit split resolved by RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, the debtor reorganization plans all proposed to
pay the secured creditors the value of their collateral 50 as the “indubitable
equivalent” of their liens on the collateral, without permitting them to credit
bid at the auctions, 51 as required under Path Two. 52 In the case of River East
Plaza, LLC, the debtor’s plan proposed to make deferred payments, as
provided under Path One, 53 while transferring the secured creditor’s lien to
treasury bonds of supposedly “indubitably equivalent” value. 54 Thus, all of
the debtors in these cases attempted to circumvent the requirements of Paths
One and Two by claiming that their plans met the indubitable-equivalence
standard of Path Three. 55 Both the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit

46. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012).
48. See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70

(2012); In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2012); In re River Rd. Partners,
LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d
Cir. 2010); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, at 244–45.
49. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 829.
50. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2067, and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC,
599 F.3d at 301, the value was determined by an auction. In Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 238,
the value was determined by the court.
51. See, e.g., In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 645; In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC,
599 F.3d at 302; In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 239.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
53. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
54. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 829.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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struck these plans down as failing to protect the rights of secured creditors
to the extent mandated by their interpretations of the statute. 56
A. THE SECURED CREDITOR’S RIGHT TO CREDIT BID
UNDER § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)
The circuit split that was resolved in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC
concerned a dispute over whether a secured creditor has the right to credit
bid at a sale of its collateral pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A). 57 Path Two of this
section, the second option for cramdown approval, provides that if a
secured creditor is to be compensated by proceeds from the sale of his
collateral, such sale must conform to the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §
363(k), 58 which provides that when a reorganization plan involves the sale
of collateral, the secured creditor must be permitted to credit bid up to the
value of its claim. 59 In Pacific Lumber Co. and In re Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC, the Third and Fifth Circuits both found that plans that
did not permit the secured creditor to credit bid at the sales of their
collateral could still pass the “fair and equitable” test under the indubitableequivalence standard of Path Three. 60 These courts reasoned that the
proceeds from the sale of the collateral were the indubitable equivalent of
that collateral, so it did not matter that the sales did not conform to Path
Two’s requirement that the secured creditor have the right to credit bid at
the sale. 61
In Pacific Lumber Co., the Fifth Circuit addressed a reorganization plan
that proposed to pay a group of secured creditors, who had liens on a
200,000-acre tract of “prime redwood timberland” (the Timberlands), the
court-determined value of the property. 62 The principal debtors in the case
were Pacific Lumber Company and Scotia Pacific LLC. 63 Pacific Lumber
Company owned and operated a sawmill and power plant. 64 Scotia Pacific
LLC, a special purpose entity wholly owned by Pacific Lumber, owned the
Timberlands. 65 Scotia Pacific gave Pacific Lumber the sole right to harvest
its timber, which Pacific Lumber then processed and sold. 66 The
56. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012); In re
River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 828.
57. In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Phila. Newspapers,
LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
58. 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
59. Id. § 363(k).
60. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 300; In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 247.
61. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 318 (affirming the district court’s finding that a
payment of sale proceeds to the secured lenders was an indubitable equivalent of its secured
claim); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 236.
62. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 236.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Timberlands were subject to a security interest held by the Bank of New
York (the Noteholders). 67 At the time that Pacific Lumber filed for
bankruptcy, Scotia Pacific owed the Noteholders $740 million. 68 When the
debtor’s exclusivity period passed without significant progress on a plan of
reorganization, the court allowed other creditors to submit plans for
approval. 69 Marathon Structured Finance (Marathon), one of Pacific
Lumber’s creditors, submitted a plan that proposed to pay the Noteholders
the court-determined value of the Timberlands, while stripping them of
their liens on the property. 70 The court ultimately approved this plan. 71
The Noteholders, who believed that the value of the property far
exceeded the court-determined value and were nevertheless denied the right
to credit bid as required under Path Two, objected to the plan.72 While the
secured lenders had a claim in the amount of $720 million, the court valued
the property at just $510 million. 73 Despite the objection of the Noteholders,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the $510 million that they received satisfied
the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three. 74 The court found that
the disjunctive “or” in § 1129(b)(2)(A) indicates that the three clauses are
alternatives and that a plan of reorganization only had to satisfy one
alternative. 75 The Pacific Lumber Co. court reasoned that a plan that met
the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three did not have to conform
to the credit-bidding requirement of Path Two. 76 The court argued that the
bankruptcy court’s valuation was reasonably accurate. 77 It went on to
conclude that payment of the value of the collateral satisfied the
indubitable-equivalence standard, arguing that “paying off the secured
creditors in cash can hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the
value of the Noteholders’ collateral.” 78
In Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit came to a similar
conclusion. In that case, debtor Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, which
owned and operated the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Daily
News, had granted a consortium of lenders a security interest in most of its
tangible assets. 79 The value of the loan at the time of filing was $318
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 245. The court characterizes this transfer of property as a sale, noting that Marathon
and its subsidiaries “received title to the assets in exchange for this purchase. That the transaction
is complex does not fundamentally alter that it involved a ‘sale’ of the Noteholders’ collateral.” Id.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id. at 245.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 248.
78. Id. at 247.
79. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
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million. 80 After filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, the debtors
submitted a reorganization plan under which it would pay the secured
creditors the proceeds from the sale of all of its assets without allowing
them to credit bid at the auction. 81 As the dissent notes, these assets were
sold to an entity controlled by the current management of the debtor
business and owned largely by the debtor’s equity holders 82 at a price that
was a fraction of the secured claim. 83 The debtors, citing Pacific Lumber
Co., argued that payment of the proceeds from the sale of the collateral
satisfied the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three. 84 The Third
Circuit agreed. 85
The court based its decision mainly on its interpretation of the statute
and congressional intent, but it also touched on public policy
considerations. The court first reasoned that “the specificity of subsection
(ii)” does not operate as “a limitation on the broader language of subsection
(iii).” 86 The court also rejected the argument advanced by the objecting
creditors, as well as the dissent (discussed below), 87 that §§ 363(k),
1111(b), 1123(a)(5)(D), and 1129(b)(2)(A), taken together, demonstrate the
intention of Congress to provide maximum protection to secured creditors’
interests in their collateral. 88 In its policy discussion, the court suggests that
the purpose of Chapter 11 is not to ensure the greatest possible return for
secured creditors, but rather to balance the interests of the parties involved:
“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two
principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the
debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests
by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” 89 Elsewhere the court
states that the Bankruptcy Code, as a whole, is designed “to balance the
interests of the secured lender and the protection of the reorganized entity”
and that nothing in the Code suggests that lenders should be “ensure[d] an
advantageous return on a secured investment.” 90
The dissent of Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC took a different
approach, which the Seventh Circuit in In re River Road Partners, LLC and
the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC ultimately followed.91
Judge Ambro argued that both the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 317.
See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069–70
(2012); In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2011).
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public policy considerations support a different conclusion: that
reorganization plans providing for the sale of collateral should be governed
exclusively by the rules of Path Two, which requires that plans proposing to
sell collateral free and clear of liens must permit secured lenders to credit
bid at the sale. 92 After noting that the statute is ambiguous, 93 Judge Ambro
argues that the structure of the Bankruptcy Code supports his reading of the
statute by showing how § 1129(b)(2)(A) works in conjunction with related
provisions. He maintains that § 1123, which governs the content of the plan,
sets out “three ways in which a plan can provide for the sale of collateral:
(i) subject to the initial lien retained by the secured creditor, (ii) free of any
lien, or (iii) after providing a replacement lien on different collateral.” 94
Judge Ambro then argues that these three paths correspond to, and help
clarify, the three paths to approval under the cramdown provision. 95 While
secured creditors whose collateral is sold under Path Two are protected by
the credit-bidding requirements of § 363(k), 96 those who keep their
collateral under a Path One plan are protected from the danger of
undervaluation by § 1111(b), 97 which permits under-secured creditors to
elect to have their deficiency claims treated as secured claims. 98 Together,
these provisions make up “a comprehensive arrangement enacted by
Congress to avoid the pitfalls of undervaluation . . . and thereby ensure that
the rights of secured creditors are protected while maximizing the value of
collateral to the estate.” 99 Congress, according to Judge Ambro, “intended
to preserve the presumptive right of a secured creditor under applicable
state law to take the property to satisfy the debt.” 100 Judge Ambro also
advances a policy-based argument that is independent from the issue of
congressional intent, arguing that the majority’s interpretation of the
cramdown provision undermines the benefits of secured credit. 101 The
Bankruptcy Code, the dissent asserts, was not intended to deprive secured
creditors of “the presumed benefits associated with secured lending.” 102
Judge Ambro also demonstrates that the interpretation of the majority
and of the Pacific Lumber Co. court is inconsistent with the absolute
priority rule. He points out that Philadelphia Newspaper’s assets were sold
to an entity controlled by the current management of the debtor business
and owned largely by the debtor’s equity holders at a price far lower than
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 337.
Id.
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the amounts of the secured claims. 103 As a result, certain equity holders
were able to retain control and ownership of the business, even though the
secured creditors were not paid in full. 104
Both the Seventh Circuit in River Road Partners, LLC and the Supreme
Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC rejected the reasoning of In re
Pacific Lumber Co. and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC and followed
Judge Ambro’s dissent. 105 The Seventh Circuit addressed a jointly
administered bankruptcy case involving two LLCs that had obtained loans
to finance the construction of hotels.106 Both companies, River Road Hotel
Partners, LLC and RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, failed to complete their
projects and ended up filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. 107 Each owed
about $150 million on their loans, which were secured by liens, at the time
of filing. 108 Both companies submitted reorganization plans that proposed to
pay the secured parties the proceeds from the sale of substantially all of the
debtors’ assets, and each claimed to have procured offers of around $45
million. 109 Neither plan permitted the secured creditors to credit bid at these
sales. 110 The bankruptcy court denied confirmation, and both the Seventh
Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed its decision. 111 The Supreme Court
noted, however, that while some lower courts—particularly the dissent in
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC—had addressed the policy-based merits of
credit bidding, 112 its decision was based purely on what it took to be the
plain meaning of the statute. 113
The decisions in Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers,
LLC appeared to give debtor businesses a way of satisfying their debts to
secured creditors at discounted rates while still holding on to the creditors’
collateral. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the absolute
priority rule. This inconsistency is evident in the facts of Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC, where junior creditors and equity holders were
essentially permitted to hold on to their collateral—by bidding at the sale—
even though the secured creditors were not paid in full. 114 The court in
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC justified this departure from the absolute
priority rule by arguing that the purpose of Chapter 11 is to strike a balance
103. Id. at 302.
104. Id. at 301–02.
105. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012); In re

River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
106. In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 643–44.
107. Id. at 644.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 645.
110. Id.
111. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2069 (2012); In re
River Rd. Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d at 653.
112. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
113. Id.
114. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
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between the interests of creditors and those of other constituencies affected
by the firm’s insolvency. 115 In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, the Supreme
Court rejected this policy-based argument as simply inconsistent with the
text of the statute, which the Court found to be unambiguous in its
requirement that secured creditors be permitted to credit bid at the sale of
their collateral. 116 In the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the statute does not
permit a plan of reorganization that provides for the sale of the secured
creditor’s collateral to forego the credit-bidding requirement of Path
Two. 117
B. THE SECURED LENDER’S RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS LIEN
UNDER § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)
In In re River East Plaza, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed a plan of
reorganization that proposed to stretch out the repayment period, a
procedure provided for by Path One, without adhering to other requirements
of Path One. 118 The Seventh Circuit thus faced a parallel issue to the one
faced by the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC. The cases
culminating in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC addressed plans that used a
procedure that is provided for in Path Two—sale of collateral free and clear
of liens—without adhering to the requirement of Path Two that secured
creditors must be permitted to credit bid. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in
River East Plaza, LLC addressed a plan that used a procedure that is
provided for in Path One—deferred payments—without adhering to the
requirement of Path One that the holders of secured claims retain their
liens. 119 As with the plans in the cases discussed above, the debtors argued
that this plan satisfied the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path
Three. 120 The Seventh Circuit, whose decision came down during the
pendency of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, found that the plan did not
satisfy the indubitable equivalent requirement of Path Three121 and went on
to argue in dicta that any plan that provided for deferred payments should
be required to adhere to the requirements of Path One.122
The secured creditor in River East Plaza, LLC was LNV Corporation
(LNV), a mortgagee who was owed $38.3 million by River East Plaza, the
debtor/mortgagor. 123 The value of the property at the time of filing was
$13.5 million. 124 After River East Plaza filed, LNV elected to have its
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 303.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
Id. at 2072.
In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 829.
Id.
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under-secured claim treated as fully secured. 125 River East Plaza eventually
proposed a plan in which it would replace LNV’s lien on the property with
a lien on $13.5 million in substitute collateral in the form of thirty-year
treasury bonds. 126 It argued that this replacement lien satisfied the
indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three because “the bonds would
grow in value in 30 years through the magic of compound interest to $38.3
million,” thus eventually paying the secured creditor the full amount of the
secured claim. 127 The bankruptcy court, as well as the Seventh Circuit,
rejected the plan as failing to satisfy the indubitable-equivalence standard of
Path Three. 128
The court first argued that a lien on thirty-year treasury bonds was
simply not the indubitable equivalent of a lien on the property in question,
noting that thirty-year treasury bonds and real property have totally
different risk profiles. 129 However, the court also reasoned that by paying
off LNV in thirty-year treasury bonds, River East Plaza was effectively
using a procedure provided for by Path One—stretching “out the repayment
of the debt beyond the period allowed by the loan agreement” 130—without
adhering to the requirement of Path One that the secured creditor retain its
lien on the collateral. 131 River East Plaza’s plan did not permit LNV to
retain its lien on the property, but rather replaced it with a lien on the thirtyyear treasury bonds. 132 Thus, the court reasoned that River East Plaza “was
in effect proposing a defective subsection (i) cramdown,”—defective
because it did not permit LNV to retain its lien—“by way of subsection
(iii).” 133
It should be noted with regard to River East Plaza, LLC that the court
simply held that the plan did not satisfy the indubitable equivalent
requirement; 134 the question of whether or not any plan that stretched out
payments as provided for in Path One could be approved under Path Three
was not properly addressed by the court. 135 Judge Posner observed the
parallel between River East Plaza, LCC and River Road Partners, LCC 136
and argued that any plan that provided for deferred payment should not be

125. Id. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012), a secured creditor whose collateral is worth less
than the total amount of its claim is permitted to elect to have its entire claim treated as a secured
claim.
126. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 830.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 830, 832.
129. Id. at 832.
130. Id. at 828, 833.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
132. In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d at 830.
133. Id. at 833.
134. Id. at 832.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 829.
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approved under Path Three, 137 but these observations were not part of the
holding because the substitution of treasury bonds failed to meet the
indubitable-equivalence standard anyway. 138
However, the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach in RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC suggests that it would validate Judge Posner’s
reasoning and reach the same conclusion regarding Path One as it did Path
Two. The Supreme Court stated in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC that “the
‘general language’ of clause (iii), ‘although broad enough to include it, will
not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with’ in clause (ii).” 139 It
would follow that since plans that provide for deferred payments are
“specifically dealt with” in Path One, the rules of Path Three “will not be
held to apply.” 140
Taken together, the holding of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and the
abovementioned dicta of River East Plaza, LLC amount to a substantial
limitation on the ability of bankruptcy courts to use the indubitableequivalence standard as a means of cramming down plans of
reorganization. Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC had
opened up the possibility that bankruptcy courts might be able to use the
flexible standard of Path Three to permit substantial modifications of the
rights of secured creditors by allowing equity holders and managers to
essentially purchase the business from secured creditors at a discount. 141
They exercised such discretion by requiring only that secured creditors
receive the value of their collateral, as determined by the price produced at
auction or by the court. 142 In contrast, the Supreme Court determined that
for plans that proceed under Path Two, secured creditors are entitled not
only to the value of the collateral, but also to the collateral itself if the
highest bid at auction falls short of their secured claim. 143 By requiring all
137. Id. at 833.
138. Id. at 832.
139. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012)

(quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (2012)).
140. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2071.
141. For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the court permitted a bidder to purchase
the assets of the business at a lower price than it would have paid if the secured lenders had been
permitted to credit bid. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro,
J. Dissenting) (“What typically occurs is that, if there are no other bidders, the secured lenders get
the assets rather than the Stalking Horse Bidder . . . . If credit bidding is denied, however, the
debtors’ insiders stand to benefit by having more leverage to steer the sale to a favored
purchaser.”).
142. Thus, for example, in Pacific Lumber Co., the court was able to limit the amount of the
Noteholder’s secured claim to the court-determined value of the Timberlands at the time of the
case. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009).
143. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2069. By requiring credit bidding for all
reorganization plans that proceed under Path Two, the Court effectively permits secured creditors
to seize their collateral any time the price produced at auction falls short of their secured claims.
Thus the Supreme Court’s decision ensures that secured creditors have an interest not only in the
value of collateral as determined by an auction, but also in the collateral itself. Jonathan Azoff,
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reorganization plans that provide for the sale of collateral to comply with
the requirements of Path Two, the Supreme Court closed off this potential
avenue of judicial discretion. In doing so, it reinforced the role of the three
clauses of § 1129(b)(2)(A) as safeguards of the state law rights of secured
creditors.
III. POLICY APPROACHES TO BANKRUPTCY LAW
Much of the commentary on these cases thus far has approved of the
prevailing interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) on the ground that it is the
product of sound statutory interpretation. 144 Commenters argue that the
interpretations of Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC
render Path Two superfluous; 145 that the legislative history supports the
interpretation of the Supreme Court; 146 that depriving secured creditors of
their right to credit bid at sales of collateral contradicts the intention of
Congress; 147 and that the overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code supports
the Supreme Court’s interpretation.148 As this Note will demonstrate in Part
IV, the prevailing interpretations of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are consistent with a
policy approach to bankruptcy law known as the creditor’s-bargain
theory. 149 The language of the court in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, on
the other hand, suggests an optimal-loss-distribution approach. 150 These
theories help to illuminate what is at stake in the courts’ competing
interpretations, as well as the function that § 1129(b)(2)(A) plays in Chapter
11 proceedings.
A. THE CREDITOR’S-BARGAIN THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain approach to bankruptcy take as a
foundational principle the following proposition: federal bankruptcy law is
a means of solving the collective action problem that arises when a debtor

Indubitable Equivalence: A Standard Designed to Protect the Secured Creditor’s Bargain, 21
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 127, 140 (2012).
144. See, e.g., Eric W. Chalut & Blair R. Zanzig, River Road: The Right Road for Selling a
Secured Lender’s Collateral Under a Chapter 11 Plan, 129 BANKING L.J. 173, 181–82 (2012);
Ben Logan et al., Seventh Circuit Takes the (River) Road Less Traveled, Creating a Circuit Split
on the Issue of the Right to Credit Bid in a Sale Pursuant to a Chapter 11 Plan, 7 PRATT’S J.
BANKR. L. 708, 711 (2011).
145. Chalut & Zanzig, supra note 144, at 183.
146. Id. at 184.
147. Id. at 186.
148. Id. at 187.
149. See infra Part IV.
150. “Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two principal interests:
facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity,
and protecting creditors’ interests by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Phila.
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2010). For more detailed summaries of these
approaches, see Baird, supra note 5; Warren, supra note 5.
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with more than one creditor goes into default. 151 In a world without
bankruptcy, each of the creditors in such a situation would have an
incentive to invoke state collection rights before other creditors in similar
positions do the same. 152 However, engaging in a race to seize all of the
debtor’s assets may not be in the best interest of the creditors
collectively. 153 Such a race would eliminate the excess of the going-concern
value over the liquidation value. 154 Bankruptcy is an orderly process that
ensures that the debtor’s assets will be put to their most productive use,
which may indeed turn out to be liquidation. 155 Thus, federal bankruptcy
law can be justified as a contractual gap-filing measure—a system
“designed to mirror the agreement one would expect . . . creditors to form
among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an
ex ante position.” 156
This reasoning, however, would not apply to creditors with security
interests, who would otherwise be free to seize their collateral. 157
Proponents of the creditor’s-bargain theory argue that general unsecured
creditors, who have strong reasons for desiring a collective proceeding, 158
would have an incentive to bargain with secured creditors for such a
proceeding. 159 Since secured creditors would have the right to seize their
collateral and thereby destroy the debtor business’ going-concern value,
they would be in the stronger bargaining position and would not settle for
anything less than what they bargained for outside of bankruptcy; that is,
they would not settle for anything less than full priority in repayment. 160
Therefore, as one prominent advocate of the creditor’s bargain theory
argues, “there is nothing ‘unfair’ about recognizing a secured creditor’s”
full priority in bankruptcy; “[i]nstead, it is exactly the sort of agreement we
would expect to see negotiated voluntarily” between secured and unsecured
creditors. 161
Bankruptcy law, according to proponents of this view, should only
modify the state law hierarchy of repayment “when doing so preserves the
value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them.” 162 Since
general unsecured creditors have the most to gain from a collective
151.
152.
153.
154.

Jackson, supra note 5, at 861–62.
Id. at 862.
Id.
If the firm’s assets are seized it cannot continue to operate its business, so any value that
could be generated by a group of assets functioning as a unit would be eliminated. See GERBER &
KUNEY, supra note 16, at 93–94.
155. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 105–06.
156. Jackson, supra note 5, at 860.
157. Id. at 868.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 121.
161. Jackson, supra note 5, at 871.
162. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 100.
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proceeding, they, rather than creditors with security interests, should bear
the risk of such proceedings. 163 A rule that distorted state law priorities by
diminishing the rights of secured creditors would encourage forum
shopping, giving equity holders and managers an incentive to enter into
bankruptcy simply to take advantage of a different set of rules. 164
Additionally, it is worth observing that most of the supporters of the
creditor’s bargain approach to bankruptcy make no comment on the utility
or wisdom of the current regime of secured credit. 165 They do not favor the
protection of secured creditors in bankruptcy because protecting secured
creditors is always good policy. 166 Rather, they argue that the utility of
affording maximum protection to secured creditors is simply not an issue of
bankruptcy law; bankruptcy law should preserve state law rights to the
extent feasible, regardless of what those rights happen to be. 167
B. THE “DISTRIBUTIVE” APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY POLICY
Another prominent approach to bankruptcy policy, which is evoked by
the court in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, regards the Bankruptcy Code
as a means of addressing a broad range of social problems that are the
inevitable byproducts of business failure. 168 Advocates of this approach
note that “the statutory scheme” of the Bankruptcy Code “presumes that
some creditors will not enjoy repayment in full;” 169 in other words, losses
are inevitable. They go on to ask: “How shall these losses be
distributed?” 170 The bargains made by secured creditors outside of
bankruptcy are just a few of the many interests that the Bankruptcy Code
should protect. 171 The Bankruptcy Code should also protect the interests of
individuals and businesses “who are not technically ‘creditors’ but who
have an interest in a business’ continued existence,” such as employees,
customers, and suppliers, as well as future tort claimants. 172
Advocates of this view argue that optimal distribution of losses is more
than a normative theory of how bankruptcy law should function; it is in fact
how Congress intended the Bankruptcy Code to function:
Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code . . . serve as reminders
that Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than
the immediate problems of debtors and their identified creditors; they
indicate clear recognition of the larger implications of a debtor’s
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 129.
Baird, supra note 5, at 818.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 110.
Id. at 110–11.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Warren, supra note 5, at 785.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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widespread default and the consequences of permitting a few creditors to
173
force a business to close.

Thus, bankruptcy courts should sometimes be permitted to alter state law
priorities to the extent necessary to reach equitable results.
IV. THE ROLE OF § 1129(b)(2)(A) IN PROTECTING THE
SECURED CREDITOR’S BARGAIN
The limitations on cramdown provisions set out in the three clauses of §
1129(b)(2)(A)—Paths One, Two, and Three—indicate the extent to which
Congress intended to protect the bargains made by secured creditors outside
of bankruptcy. 174 Both the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Lumber Co. and the Third
Circuit in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC suggest that Congress intended to
permit bankruptcy courts to use Path Three of § 1129(b)(2)(A) to modify
state law priorities, at the expense of secured creditors, by using the
indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three as way of approving plans
that appeared to proceed under different paths. 175 The Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC court evoked the distributive theory in its reasoning:
“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between two
principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the
debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests
by maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” 176 The interpretation of
the Supreme Court, on the other hand, limits this discretion by prohibiting
courts from using the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three for
any plan that proceeds under Path One. 177 In doing so, it reinforced the
protection of state law priorities in bankruptcy and therefore the bargains
made by secured creditors outside of bankruptcy.
This is a sound result because the three clauses of § 1129(b)(2)(A)
function as safeguards of the state law rights of secured creditors, not as
means of altering state law priorities. In the implicit bargain between
secured and unsecured creditors posited by creditor’s-bargain advocates,
secured creditors would consent to a collective bankruptcy proceeding as
173. Id. at 788.
174. This is because these three clauses set out the only circumstances under which a secured

creditor may be forced to accept less than full repayment of its secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(2012). The stricter the limitations on approval of such a plan, the more the Code protects secured
creditors.
175. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The use of the word ‘or’
in this provision operates to provide alternatives—a debtor may proceed under subsection (i), (ii),
or (iii), and need not satisfy more than one subsection.”); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229,
246 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)) (“Although a credit bid option might
render Clause (ii) imperative in some cases, it is unnecessary here because the plan offered a cash
payment to the Noteholders. Clause (iii) thus affords a distinct basis for confirming a plan if it
offered the Noteholders the ‘realization . . . of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.’”).
176. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 303.
177. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).
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long as the unsecured creditors were willing to bear the risk. 178 Creditors
whose loans are bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims would in fact
prefer such a proceeding because it would likely result in a greater return on
the unsecured portion of their debt. 179 Such creditors would consent,
therefore, to the temporary suspension of their contract rights that facilitate
a collective proceeding. 180 However, since outside of bankruptcy they
would have been able to seize their collateral, secured creditors would have
no reason to consent to less than full priority in repayment. 181 From this
perspective, § 1129, which governs the standards a plan of reorganization
must meet in order to be confirmed, should afford maximum protection to
secured creditors because these creditors would presumably bargain for
robust protections.
The strict requirements of Paths One and Two of § 1129(b)(2)(A)
indicate that Path Three should function as a protection of the bargains of
secured creditors. Secured creditors who are forced into Path One—
deferred payments—are ensured the benefit of their bargain in two ways: by
the requirements that they retain their liens 182 and be permitted to elect
under § 1111(b) to have their claims treated as fully secured. 183 Secured
creditors forced into Path Two—sale of collateral—are ensured the benefit
of their bargain by the requirement that they be permitted to credit bid at the
sale of their collateral. 184 Both of these paths protect more than the secured
creditor’s interest in the value of its collateral at the time the plan is
submitted; they protect the secured creditor’s interest in the actual collateral
for which it bargained, which would otherwise be protected under nonbankruptcy law. 185
The rationale for requiring credit bidding at sales of collateral is to
ensure that a secured creditor’s interest will not be under-valued, either at
an auction or by the court, 186 and thus to ensure that the secured creditor
will not be any worse off in bankruptcy than it would be outside of
bankruptcy. The secured creditor in Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC
bargained for a lien on the personal property of Philadelphia Newspapers,
LLC, not for a guarantee of the value that the property would produce at a
bankruptcy auction. 187 There are two problems with transferring the secured
178. Jackson, supra note 5, at 868.
179. Upon the bankruptcy filing, the claims of creditors with security interests in assets that are

worth less than their claims are bifurcated into “allowed secured claims” and unsecured claims. 11
U.S.C. § 506; see also WARREN, supra note 6, at 46–49.
180. For a discussion of the benefits of the bankruptcy process for both secured and unsecured
creditors, see Jackson, supra note 5, at 858–72.
181. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 106.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
183. Id. § 1111(b).
184. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
185. Azoff, supra note 143, at 140.
186. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 332 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J. Dissenting).
187. Id. at 301.
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creditor’s lien from the property itself to the proceeds from the sale of the
property. First, the highest bids at bankruptcy auctions typically fall well
below the fair value of the property, 188 as was the case in Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC. 189 Likewise, bankruptcy judges may undervalue
collateral to the detriment of secured creditors, as was the case in Pacific
Lumber Co. 190 Second, the value of property, real property in particular,
fluctuates over time; if collateral is sold while the market is down, secured
parties will suffer losses. As the dissent argues in Philadelphia Newspapers,
LLC, the right to credit bid is meant to protect secured creditors from the
danger of undervaluation. 191 It also prevents junior creditors from engaging
in maneuvers, such as those engaged in by the equity holders in
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, which effectively permit them to benefit at
the expense of senior creditors.
Likewise, the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path Three is best
understood not as a grant of discretion to the court, but rather as a safeguard
of the bargains made under state law by secured creditors.192 Commenters
have observed that the standard articulated in Murel is a demanding one,
and that “Judge Hand framed indubitable equivalence in reference to the
creditor’s expectations.” 193 Courts have also observed that “the ‘fair and
equitable’ requirement does not look toward protection of debtor interests,
but rather toward protection of dissenting creditor interests.”194
Thus, the “fair and equitable” standard is best understood as an
application of the absolute priority rule, not an exception to it. The courts in
Pacific Lumber Co. and Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC use the indubitableequivalence standard as a means of altering state law priority of payment in
order to balance the interests of all of the parties involved. 195 The result is
that junior creditors have an incentive to use bankruptcy simply as a means
of taking a larger slice of the repayment pie than they would have taken
outside of bankruptcy, and equity holders have an incentive to use
bankruptcy simply as a means of retaining control of a company at a
discounted price. This incentive structure is likely to prevent the firm’s
assets from being put to their highest value use. 196 As Baird and Jackson

188. Leonard P. Goldberger & Harvey L. Tepner, A Guide for Acquiring Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 521, 522 (2001).
189. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 332.
190. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2009).
191. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 332.
192. Azoff, supra note 143, at 140.
193. Id. at 133.
194. In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1984).
195. See, e.g., In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 303 (“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code strikes a balance between two principal interests: facilitating the reorganization and
rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity, and protecting creditors’ interests by
maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”).
196. Baird & Jackson, supra note 16, at 109.
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warn, junior parties will “systematically make decisions that ignore the real
costs of keeping the firm together.” 197
The facts of Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC provide a useful illustration
of the adverse effects of using the indubitable-equivalence standard of Path
Three to alter state law priorities in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. In
that case the court approved a plan of reorganization that proposed to sell
the secured creditor’s collateral without permitting the secured creditor to
credit bid and to use the proceeds from the sale as the “indubitable
equivalent” of the collateral. 198 As the dissent notes, Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC’s assets were sold to an entity controlled by the current
management of the debtor business and owned largely by the debtor’s
equity holders 199 at a price that was a fraction of the secured claim. 200 The
dissent also notes that “the debtor’s strategies were designed ‘not to
produce the highest and best offer.’”201 In other words, the debtor’s insiders
were able to purchase substantially all of the assets of the company, free
and clear of liens, at a price much lower than the creditors’ secured claim.
Junior creditors (the current equity holders) benefitted at the expense of
senior creditors (the secured lenders). Such a result gives equity holders an
incentive to enter into bankruptcy simply to take advantage of a different set
of rules.
CONCLUSION
The three cramdown paths of § 1129(b)(2)(A) were designed to ensure
secured creditors the benefits of their state law bargains; accordingly,
protection of the state law priority of secured creditors should be the
guiding policy consideration for courts interpreting this subparagraph. This
is not to say that the enhancement of the collection efforts of secured
creditors is or should be the objective of every provision in the Bankruptcy
Code. The procedural rules that facilitate a collective bankruptcy
proceeding are designed to further the interests of the firm, and thereby
those of other constituencies that would benefit from the firm’s survival,
such employees and suppliers, at the temporary expense of secured
creditors. However, the rules governing the substance of the plan of
repayment, of which § 1129(b)(2)(A) is one, should not give preferential
treatment to parties that would not enjoy such treatment outside of
bankruptcy. While the “debtor in process of reorganization . . . is given

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 110.
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 302.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 319 (quoting In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09–11204, 2009 WL 3242292, at
*10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009)).
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many temporary protections against the normal operation of law . . . , the
reorganized debtor is supposed to stand on his own two feet.” 202
Brian P. Hanley *
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